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During the Industrial Revolution technological progress and innovation became the main drivers of
economic growth. But why was Britain the technological leader? We argue that one hitherto little recognized
British advantage was the supply of highly skilled, mechanically able craftsmen who were able to
adapt, implement, improve, and tweak new technologies and who provided the micro inventions necessary
to make macro inventions highly productive and remunerative. Using a sample of 759 of these mechanics
and engineers, we study the incentives and institutions that facilitated the high rate of inventive activity
during the Industrial Revolution. First, apprenticeship was the dominant form of skill formation. Formal
education played only a minor role. Second, many skilled workmen relied on secrecy and first-mover
advantages to reap the benefits of their innovations. Over 40 percent of the sample here never took
out a patent. Third, skilled workmen in Britain often published their work and engaged in debates
over contemporary technological and social questions. In short, they were affected by the Enlightenment
culture. Finally, patterns differ for the textile sector; therefore, any inferences from textiles about the
whole economy are likely to be misleading.
Ralf Meisenzahl
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System









1The main explanations for the low level of income per capita growth during the decades of the Industrial
Revolution are the unprecedented rate of population growth in this period, as well as the incidence of bad weather and
war. 
Introduction. 
The Industrial Revolution was the first period in which technological progress and
innovation became major factors in economic growth. There is by now general agreement that
during the seventy years or so traditionally associated with the Industrial Revolution, there was little
economic growth as traditionally measured in Britain, but that in large part this was to be expected.
1
The sectors in which technological progress occurred grew at a rapid rate, but they were small in
1760, and thus their effect on growth was limited at first (Mokyr 1998, pp. 12-14 ). Yet progress
took place in a wide range of industries and activities, not just in cotton and steam. A full description
of the range of activities in which innovation took place or was at least attempted cannot be provided
here, but inventions in some pivotal industries such as iron and mechanical engineering had
backward linkages in many more traditional industries. In the words of McCloskey (1981, p. 118),
“the Industrial Revolution was neither the age of steam, nor the age of cotton, nor the age of iron.
It was the age of progress.” A similar point has been made by Temin (1997). 
Outside the familiar tales of cotton textiles, wrought iron, and steam power, there were
improvements in many aspects of production, such as mechanical and civil engineering, food
processing, brewing, paper, glass, cement, mining, and shipbuilding. Some of the more famous
advances of the time may have had a negligible direct effect on growth rates, but improved the
quality of life in other ways; one thinks above all of smallpox inoculation and vaccination, the
mining safety lamp, hot air and hydrogen balloons, food canning, and gas lighting (Mokyr, 1990,
2009a). Britain was the world leader in innovation for a period of about a century, after which its2
2For a slightly dated survey, see Mokyr (1998, pp. 28-81). Recent contributions focus on institutions (North and
Weingast, 1989; Mokyr, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010), and the roles of factor prices and coal discussed below.
3Two examples should suffice: the pathbreaking work in using stratigraphic data to locate coal (Manchester,
2001) and the “miner’s friend” invented by Humphry Davy (James, 2005). 
dominance slowly dissolved.  Yet Britain retained a place as one of many western nations that
collaborated in a joint program to apply a rapidly growing knowledge base to economic production.
What drove British leadership, and why was Britain the most technologically advanced
economy in the world for so long? The question has been attacked many times, and with many
different answers.
2 In the spirit of this volume, it seems to make sense to make a distinction between
the rate of technological progress and its direction, which have often been confused in the literature.
In his recent influential work, Allen (2009a, 2009b) has resurrected induced innovation theory and
re-emphasized the role of factor prices in generating the inventions that formed the Industrial
Revolution. Yet the high wages that Allen emphasized may have imparted a labor-saving direction
on the innovations, but it is hard to use them to explain the “engine of growth” which is the growing
body of useful knowledge and its ever-greater accessibility in the eighteenth century. As an
alternative many scholars, led by Wrigley (2004, 2010) have emphasized the importance of the
availability of coal in Britain; this may explain a bias toward fuel-intensive and perhaps the
replacement of water- and animal-powered plants by steam-driven ones. Yet the improvements in
coal technology point to the fact that coal production itself was subject to deeper forces.
3 Moreover,
the progress in water power technology in the eighteenth century indicates that even without coal,
energy-saving technological progress was feasible, and even that without coal Britain would have
had experienced an Industrial Revolution, albeit one that would have a somewhat different dynamic
(Clark and Jacks, 2007).3
4In his contribution to the 1962 Rate and Direction volume, Fritz Machlup (1962) discussed at some length the
concept of “inventive labor.” Part of our purpose is to unpack that term into those “inventive workers” who are truly
innovative, and those who fill in the gaps and improve the original insights whom we refer to as tweakers. While the
context here is historical, there is little doubt that this concept can readily be extended to our own time. 
5In this paper we will be little concerned with truly epochal or macroinventions. 
6In another paper in the original volume, John Enos (1962) distinguishes between the “alpha” stage (the original
invention) and the “beta” stage (improvement). This parallels our distinction. His finding is that most of the productivity
growth in the petroleum refining industry occurred during the beta stage (p. 319). 
In what follows, we will take a closer look at one particular aspect: the importance of
technological competence and the incentives of those people who were the practical carriers of
technological progress in this era.
4 Competence is defined here as the high-quality workmanship and
materials needed to implement an innovation, that is, to follow the blueprint with a high level of
accuracy, carry out the instructions embodied in the technique, and to have the ability to install,
operate, adapt, and repair the machinery and equipment  under a variety of circumstances. Beyond
those, competence often involved minor improvements and refinements of a technique, which may
not have qualified as a “microinvention” stricto sensu, but clearly enhanced the innovative effort in
economy.
5 In principle, it is easy to see that there are deep complementarities between the small
group of people who actually invent things and can be identified as such, and the somewhat larger
group of skilled workmen who possessed the training and natural dexterity to actually carry out the
“instructions” contained in the new recipes and blueprints that inventors wrote with a high degree
of accuracy, build the parts on a routine basis with very low degrees of tolerance, and still could fill
in the blanks when the instructions were inevitably incomplete.
6 We argue that of Britain’s industrial
precocity owed a great deal to the high level of competence of  those engineers and mechanics who
provided the support for the inventors. 
But who were they? Identifying competence falls somewhere the two extremes of either4
7Among the better-known of these inventions were the Robert continuous paper-making machine, the Jacquard
loom, Berthollet’s bleaching process, Leblanc’s soda-making process, Lebon’s gaslighting technique, De Girard’s
spinning machine for linen yarn, Friedrich Koenig’s steam-driven printer, Appert’s invention of food canning, and the
Argand lamp. 
studying a handful of heroic inventors whose names are well known, and searching for variables that
measure the overall national level of some critical input such as human capital or the supply of
entrepreneurship in the population. Neither of those is satisfactory. Modern economic history has
long ago distanced itself from the heroic hagiographies in which the Industrial Revolution was
attributed to the genius of a few superstar inventors. On the other hand, it may seriously be doubted
whether the average level of education of the laboring class (say, the bottom two thirds of the
income distribution) made much difference to the outcome (Mitch, 1998).  
Moreover, did Britain have a comparative advantage in macroinventions such as steampower
and cotton spinning? While Britain did have a large number of “hall of fame” inventors, it was
equally able to adopt inventions made overseas. It may be surmised that Britain may have had an
absolute advantage in macroinventions, its comparative advantage was in smaller improvements and
competence — as illustrated by the large number of highly skilled technicians that Britain
“exported” to the Continent. At the same time a flow of substantial continental inventions found
their first applications in Britain, presumably because other factors, complementary with the
innovations, were present in larger quantities.
7 But what were these complementarities? Britain
provided a freer market, and overall may have had an institutional environment that was more
conducive to innovation. But its human capital advantage in the form of skilled workmen is the one
element that has not been sufficiently stressed. 
We may distinguish between three levels of activity that drove innovation in this period. One
were the macroinventions and other major breakthroughs that solved a major bottleneck and opened5
8We will use a somewhat wider definition for these major inventions than the one in Mokyr (1990a), which
defines macroinventions in terms of their epistemic innovativeness and effect on the marginal product of further
improvements. Here even inventions that were not dramatic new insights but had a major impact on the economy, such
as the mule and the puddling and rolling process would be classified as such. 
9A notable exception was the Dartmouth blacksmith Thomas Newcomen, who in the phrase of a recent author
was “the first (or very nearly) and clearly the most important member of a tribe of a very particular, and historically
original, type: the English artisan-engineer-entrepreneur” (Rosen, 2010, p. 40).  
a new door.
8 We will refer to these inventors as major inventors, and they are, by and large, the ones
that made it into economic history textbooks. Another was the myriad of small and medium
cumulative microinventions that improved and debugged existing inventions, adapted them to new
uses, and combined them in new applications.  The people engaged in those will be referred to as
tweakers in the sense that they improved and debugged an existing invention. Some of the more
important advances among those may have been worth patenting, but clearly this was not uniformly
the case. A third group, and perhaps the least recognized of Britain’s advantages, was the existence
of a substantial number of skilled workmen capable of building, installing, operating, and
maintaining new and complex equipment. The skills needed for pure implementers were substantial,
but they did not have to be creative themselves.  We will refer to these as implementers. It goes
without saying that the line between tweakers and implementers is blurry, but at the very least a
patent or some prize for innovation would be a clear signal of creativity. 
 Some of the greatest technical minds of the Industrial Revolution clearly were good at all
three, but the vast majority of highly skilled mechanics did not invent much that posterity
remembers.
9 It has been argued that artisans alone, without the help of any “great inventors,” could
have generated much of the technological progress of the period simply by incrementally improving6
10 Hilaire-Pérez (2007)  and Berg (2007)  believe that “an economy of imitation” could  lead to a self-sustaining
process of improvement, driven purely by artisans. Such sequences of microinventions, without any shifts in the
technological paradigm, were doomed to bog down into diminishing returns. 
11Some of the unsung heroes of the Industrial Revolution were these less-known tweakers. Thus Josias C.
Gamble (1775–1848), an Irishman trained in Glasgow, was essential to James Muspratt’s introduction of the Leblanc
process in Britain (Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 187); a variety of mechanics, such as William Horrocks of Stockport
and many others who improved upon Cartwright’s powerloom (Marsden, 1895, pp. 70-72); William Woollat was
Jedediah Strutt’s brother in law and helped him develop a mechanized stocking frame that could make ribbed hosiery
(Fitton and Wadsworth, 1958, p. 24). 
and adapting existing technology.
10 Yet sophisticated artisanal economies had thrived in Europe
since the late middle ages, and there was no reason for them to be delayed to the second half of the
eighteenth century if they had been capable of generating an Industrial Revolution by themselves.
At the same time, “great inventors” without the support of high-quality competence, were equally
doomed to create economically meaningless curiosa (of which Leonardo’s myriad inventions are
just one example). 
The strong complementarity between the three forms of technological activity is critical  to
the understanding of the question of “why Britain.” A nation that possessed a high level of technical
competence could successfully implement major inventions wherever made. The economic success
of inventors depended, among other things, on their ability to find tweakers to get the bugs out of
the invention, and implementers to construct, install and operate it. To quote a famous example,
James Watt, the paradigmatic “heroic” inventor depended for his success not only on the ability of
John Wilkinson to bore the cylinders for his machine with great accuracy, but also some of his
brilliant employees such as William Murdoch (Griffiths, 1992) as well as highly competent
engineers such as John Southern and James Lawson (Roll, 1930, pp. 260–61).
11 Their ability to build
and maintain equipment embodying new technology inevitably  spilled over to small adaptations and
adjustments that would have to be regarded as minor incremental innovations.7
The emphasis on mechanical skills and dexterity has major implications for the assessment
of the role of human capital in the British Industrial Revolution. The group to focus on is not so
much the few dozens or so major inventors and scientists that can be denoted as “great
inventors”(Khan, 2006), nor should we concentrate on the human capital of the mass of factory
workers, many of whom were still poorly educated and illiterate as late as 1850.  Instead the focus
ought to be the top 3-5 percent of the labor force in terms of skills: engineers, mechanics,
millwrights, chemists, clock- and instrument makers, skilled carpenters and metal workers,
wheelwrights, and similar workmen. Their numbers were in the tens of thousands, and the vast bulk
of them are impossible to trace. Many of them were independent artisans and entrepreneurs; others
were in the employ of others. A considerable number were both or switched from one to the other.
But we shall make an effort to find at least the best-known of them, although survival bias here is
impossible to avoid and we can make no presumption that those who end up in our sample are
representative.
Skills and Competence  
 What evidence is there to support Britain’s advantage in tweakers and implementers? In a
famous letter to his partner, John Roebuck, James Watt wrote in 1765 that “my principal hindrance
in erecting engines is always smith-work” (Smiles, 1874, p. 92) and he had considerable difficulty
finding “workmen capable of fitting together the parts of a machine so complicated and of so novel
a construction” (id. p. 196; see also Roll, [1930], 1968, p. 61). Yet, while competence was thus a
binding constraint, Watt‘s engines, and those of many other machine-builders did get built and were8
12A typical description of a competent British worker was provided by the engineer William Fairbairn in a book
first published in 1863 “The millwright of former days was to a great extent the sole representative of mechanical art
... a kind of jack of all trades who could with equal facility work at a lathe, the anvil, or the carpenter’s bench... a fair
arithmetician who could calculate the velocities,  strength and power of machines...Such was the character and condition
of the men who designed and carried out most of the mechanical work of this country up to the middle and end of the
last century”  (Fairbairn, 1871, p. ix-x).
13A Swiss visitor, César de Saussure noticed in 1727 that “English workmen are everywhere renowned, and
justly. They work to perfection, and though not inventive, are capable of improving and of finishing most admirably what
the French and Germans have invented" (de Saussure, [c. 1727], 1902, p. 218, letter dated May 29, 1727). Josiah Tucker,
a keen contemporary observer, pointed out in 1758 that “the Number of Workmen [in Britain] and their greater
Experience excite the higher Emulation, and cause them to excel the Mechanics of other Countries in these Sorts of
Manufactures” (Tucker, 1758, p. 26). The French political economist Jean-Baptiste Say noted in 1803 that “the enormous
wealth of Britain is less owing to her own advances in scientific acquirements, high as she ranks in that department, as
to the wonderful practical skills of her adventurers [entrepreneurs] in the useful application of knowledge and the
superiority of her workmen” (Say [1803], 1821, Vol. 1, pp. 32–33).
14His colleague Michael Alcock modernized the famed St. Etienne ironworks in France in the 1760s with the
help of skilled workmen that his wife had recruited in England. A third striking case of such migration is that of William
Wilkinson, the brother of the famous Broseley ironmonger, who was charged with setting up cannon foundries and blast
furnaces, at an astronomical salary of 60,000 livres per year.
of high quality.
12  Foreign observers, perhaps more than local writers (who took Britain’s superiority
for granted) noted the comparatively high level of competence of British skilled workmen.
13 The
flows of the kind of useful knowledge associated with workmanship are quite unambiguous.
Industrial spies from the Continent converged on Britain to study the fine details of British
engineering and iron-making (Harris, 1998), and British technicians, mechanics, and skilled
workmen left the country in droves to find employment in France, Germany, Belgium, as well as
Eastern Europe, and this despite the fact that such emigration was prohibited by law until 1824 and
that a state of war existed between Britain and many of these countries for most of the years between
1780 and 1815 (Harris, 1998; Henderson, 1954). It is telling, for example that one of the best-known
eighteenth century engineering migrants to the Continent, John Holker (1719–1786), made his career
when he moved a number of highly skilled Lancashire workmen to the embryonic cotton industry
in Rouen after which he rose to the position of “inspector-general of foreign manufactures” in 1756.
His mandate in that job was, among others, to recruit more British workers.
14 After 1815, the number9
15As late as 1840, a British official informed a Parliamentary Committee that in the cotton mills in the Vienna
area “the directors and foremen are chiefly Englishmen or Scotsmen from the cotton manufactories of Glasgow and
Manchester” (Henderson, 1954, p. 196). In countries with even less supplies of local skilled workmen, the importance
of foreigners was even more important; much of the iron used to build St. Petersburg’s famed bridges came from a local
ironworks managed by Charles Baird (1766–1843), working with his son and his nephew.
16The Swiss inventor Aimé Argand, designed a new oil-burning lamp but his attempts to build and sell it in Paris
failed. He went to Britain in the 1780s, where he sought and found the help of the great entrepreneur Matthew Boulton;
sadly, commercial fortune eluded him here as well. More luck had the Saxon Rudolph Ackermann  (1764– 1834), who
arrived in London in 1787 to make major contributions to the technology of coachmaking and lithography and whose
firm survived until 1992. 
17The relative weakness of the guilds was in part the result of the declining power of their traditional ally, the
monarchy. Second, guilds were an urban phenomenon, yet some crucial mechanical occupations such as mining
engineers emerged on the countryside. Last, industry had the continuous option to produce on the countryside which also
weakened the power of the urban guilds.
of British engineers and mechanics that swarmed all over the Continent increased, including
especially in such early industrializers as Belgium and Switzerland. The most famous family here
were William Cockerill and his sons, who set up the most successful machine-toll manufacturing
plant in continental Europe in Verviers in eastern Belgium (Mokyr, 1976).
15  The same was true in
civil engineering. The first permanent bridge across the Danube connecting Buda and Pest was
commenced in 1839 under the engineering control of William Tierney Clark. At the same time,
highly original and creative minds from the European Continent found their way to Britain, in search
of an environment in which their inventions could be exploited and the complementary skills that
made the development of their inventions possible.
16
On the supply side, Britain’s apprenticeship system worked exceptionally well in producing
highly skilled workers that could serve as implementers, despite (or perhaps because) of the
weakness of British guilds (Humphries, 2003).
17 The Statue of Artificers of 1563, which regulated
apprenticeship, did not cover many mechanical occupations and its regulations were often ignored
(Wallis, 2008). All this contributed to labor markets that on the eve of the Industrial Revolution were
more flexible and less encumbered than on the Continent.10
18The puddlers, an expertise that emerged quickly after Henry Cort’s pathbreaking invention in 1785 were, in
the words of one scholar trained “by doing, not by talking, and developed a taciturnity that lasted all their life” (Gale,
1961–62, p. 9). 
19Reflecting on the supply of the craftsmen he employed , Watt noted in 1794 that many of them had been
trained in analogous skills “such as millwrights, architects and surveyors,” with the practical skills and dexterity spilling
over from occupation to occupation (cited by Jones, 2008, p. 126–27).
The fact that millwrights were entirely produced through the apprenticeship system
highlights its importance for the formation of skill and competence in Britain. In a recent paper,
Karine van der Beek (2010) has shown that in the period 1710-1772 at least, the English system
produced larger numbers of apprentices in high-skilled occupations, especially in machinery-
building and precision instruments, and that this took place in the industrializing midlands, where
the demand for such skills was highest. At the same time the relative tuition paid to masters in high
skill occupations did not increase in the long run, indicating that  the apprenticeship system  was
sufficiently flexible to supply enough competent craftsmen . Much of the competence of these
skilled workers still was in the nature of tacit knowledge, which could not be learned only from
books and articles but required hands-on instruction and personal experience. The degree of tacitness
varied from industry to industry, but was especially marked in the iron industry (Harris, 1988,
1992).
18 Yet whether tacit or not, there can be little doubt that this strength of Britain played a
central role in its success. Its skilled workers, freed from enforceable labor market restrictions, often
moved from area to area, diversifying their human capital portfolios and at the same time enhancing
innovation by applying ideas from one field to another, a kind of technological hybridizing.
19 
At the top of the pyramid emerged a small group of professional inventors, the kind of person
of whom Smith wrote his famous lines that inventions were often made by “men of speculation,
whose trade is not to do anything but to observe everything” ([1776], 1976, p. 14). Some of the great11
20Thus Patrick Miller (1731–1815), a wealthy Scottish banker, was a pioneer in the mechanical propulsion of
boats and one of the first to experiment with steam power on a vessel, yet this was obviously more of a hobby than a
serious occupation (although Miller did take out a patent on a shallow-draft vessel). Another famous amateur inventor
(at least in the sense of not being motivated by financial gain) was Charles Earl of Stanhope (1753–1816), a radical
member of the House of Lords who also made notable contributions to the technology of early steamship design and
whose improved printing press was purchased by The Times and Oxford University Press. 
inventors of the Industrial Revolution, such as Crompton, Cartwright, Smeaton, and Harrison should
be seen as full-time inventors, although their mechanical abilities probably exceeded their
knowledge of “experimental philosophy.” Others were educated part-timers who dabbled in
invention and engineering; some of those were scientists such as Humphry Davy and Joseph
Priestley, but gifted and obsessed amateurs also made considerable contributions.
20  Smith’s
inventive philosophers would, however, have had no effect on the economy had there been no
dexterous and ingenious workmen to carry out and improve their designs. 
How were these individuals incentivized? Britain, of course, had a patent system, which has
been discussed at length in the literature (Mokyr, 2009b) and to which we will return below. But
there were other ways in which ingenuity was rewarded. One was the awarding of prizes, set either
ex ante for someone who solved a known problem, or ex post for someone whose contribution was
widely recognized but who was not able to reap the rewards. The Society of Arts (f. 1754) set clear
targets, such as machines that would encourage the manufacture of lace, to reduce both the
dependence on French imports and encourage the employment of women (Griffiths, Hunt, and
O’Brien, 1992, p. 886). These premiums were set in advance, yet the condition for their award was
that no patent was taken out. In other cases, the Society awarded medals to inventors who had little
interest in taking out patents (e.g., the engineer and educational writer Richard Lovell Edgeworth,
who won numerous medals). It clearly provided an alternative model to the patent system (Harrison,
2006).  In a few notable cases, Parliament stepped in and awarded grants or pensions to inventors12
21One well-known example is the Scottish engineer Peter Ewart (1767–1842), who worked for a time for
Boulton and Watt, then went into business with Samuel Oldknow and Samuel Greg, then opened his own mill in 1811,
and eventually ended up employed by the admiralty. His colleague, William Brunton (1777–1851) was also employed
in Boulton and Watt’s Soho work, which he left in 1808 to take another employment. Eventually he became a partner
at a iron foundry in Birmingham and then moved to London where he practiced as an independent civil engineer.  
of considerable merit. For others, especially those who were in business for themselves, a major
form of reward was what we would call today “first-mover” advantage: by producing goods and
services that were just a little better and more reliable or cheaper than their competitors’, they could
make an excellent living.
Many of the most successful innovators in the Industrial Revolution were thus incentivized
by multiple mechanisms: although in many cases they relied on patents or secrecy to protect the
rent-generating intellectual property rights, as often they placed their knowledge in the public
domain and relied on superior technology or competence. The reality on the ground was, however,
that it is in many cases impractical to distinguish between those who lived off their reputation as
consultants or employees and those who were in business for themselves. In the course of a career,
many mechanics and engineers switched back and forth from entrepreneurial activity and self
employment to hired employees.
21
Beyond the standard economic notions of incentives, the rate and direction of technological
progress during the Industrial Revolution were affected by a Zeitgeist that may be termed a
mechanical culture, in which science and chemistry found their way to the shopfloor where
entrepreneurs and engineers tried to apply them in their stubborn attempts to achieve
“improvements” (Jacob, 2007). Mechanical culture was part and parcel of the Industrial
Enlightenment. It implied that many of the efforts to improve machinery fed on a culture that placed
technological questions at the center of the social agenda. The second half of the eighteenth century13
22A rather striking example of this is the case of Samuel Crompton, the inventor of the mule, arguably the most
productive invention of the Industrial Revolution. It was said of him that he was “or a retiring and unambitious
disposition,” and hence he took out no patent on his invention. His only regret was that public curiosity would “not allow
him to enjoy his little invention in his garret” and to earn undisturbed the fruits of his ingenuity and perseverance
(Baines, 1835, p. 199). Yet even Crompton had to make ends meet and in the end appealed to Parliament for a reward
for having made an invention that so palpably benefitted the realm. In 1812 Parliament awarded him £ 5,000, which he
subsequently lost in a failed business venture (Farnie, 2004). Another, much less famous, example is that of the Scottish
plowmaker James Small (1740-1793) who redesigned the all-iron plow according to formal principles and wrote the
standard text on plow design. Small insisted that this knowledge be made generally available and declined to take out
a patent. He enjoyed the patronage of the two great Scottish agricultural innovators, Lord Kames and John Sinclair. His
workshop in Berwickshire produced fine plows, though they were not universally popular. 
witnessed the maturing of the Baconian Program, which postulated that useful knowledge was the
key to social improvement. In that culture, technological progress could thrive. The signs of that
culture were everywhere: in which books and articles were published, in what people discussed in
coffeehouses and pubs, in the establishment of scientific clubs and societies, and through all of them
what happened in the workshops and factories. None of this is to deny that economic incentives were
central to the story, just that they were neither “everything” nor “the only thing.” The best-known
people affected by this culture were the famous enlightened industrialists such as Josiah Wedgwood,
Matthew Boulton, Benjamin Gott, Richard Crawshay, John Kennedy, and John Marshall. Their
commitment to the culture of improvement through the application of useful knowledge to issues
in manufacturing are paradigmatic examples of the Industrial Enlightenment (Jones, 2008).
Economic motives were not always  central to the men who made the Industrial Revolution.
22 Those
who came from science, such as Davy  and Faraday were probably close to the Frenchman
Berthollet, the inventor of the chlorine bleaching process, who famously wrote that “When one loves
science, one has little need for fortune which would only risk one’s happiness” (cited by Musson
and Robinson, 1969, p. 266). But did this culture “filter down” to the layer of lesser known  people
in the layer just below them? 
In what follows, we try to build a database not so much of “superstar  inventors” but of the14
layer of technically competent individuals just below them: the engineers, mechanics, chemists, and
skilled craftsmen who improved and implemented the inventions of the more famous men. We show
how these “tweakers” were trained, what incentives drove them (that is, how they made their living),
and how deeply they were immersed in the intellectual life of the Industrial Enlightenment.
Database 
Our main purpose is to shed light on the technological environment that bred technological
success and innovation in the British Industrial Revolution. Rather than focus primarily on “great
inventors,” our argument concentrates on “competence” — that is, we look for the persons whose
dexterity and training allowed them to tweak and implement the new techniques. To be in the
sample, they had to have made some inventions themselves (the bulk of them would be
microinventions and adaptations), but their main activity was implementation. It would be futile to
distinguish between inventors and pure non-inventors in a strict sense, simply because the process
of innovation consists of both the new technique and  its implementation, and during the
implementation process inevitably problems are resolved and the technique is tweaked and adapted
to the particular needs of the user. Most inventors spent much of their lives working on existing
techniques that they or others had generated.
 It must be stressed that this kind of project inevitably runs into a “tip-of-the-iceberg”
problem. We have no illusions that the bulk of competent technicians who determined both rate and
the direction of the Industrial Revolution in Britain simply did not leave enough of a record to15
23Moreover, the population of known inventors consists mostly of the population of successful inventors — it
stands to reason that many of the engineers and mechanics also made additional efforts in that direction that either failed,
or for which they failed to receive credit. Some “failed” inventions, such as the Stirling engine, invented by clergyman
Robert Stirling in 1816, have become famous, but the vast bulk of such failures will remain unknown. 
become known to posterity.
23 To leave a record, an individual had to do something more than just
be a competent and productive employee or artisan. The argument we make is one of continuity: if
we can uncover some of the layer of competent workers below the superstars, we may be able to say
something about what motivated these people and how they interacted with their institutional, and
cultural environments.
 We are interested in the “classical” Industrial Revolution and so we use primarily sources
that focus on activities before 1860. To this end we have constructed a prosopographical database
that is composed of men (there is one woman in the sample), born before 1830, of a technical ability
that was sufficient to make it into the literature (we excluded all persons whose role was purely
entrepreneurial or commercial). We are interested in tweakers, engineers and mechanics who made
minor improvements on existing inventions. Hence for them to have taken out a patent is a sufficient
condition to be included in the sample, but so would a mention of any kind of some innovation,
invention, or improvement of existing technology. However, only a small subset of persons listed
as having taken out any sort of patent before 1850 are included, because the majority of patentees
left no other record. Our sample, then, consists of what we judge to have been successful careers at
the cutting edge of technology: engineers, chemists, mechanics, clock- and instrument makers,
printers, and so on. 
One source is the collection of biographies of British engineers put together by Skempton
et al (2002). It is quite detailed, and many of the essays are written by experts, but because it is
focused on engineers, it is biased toward road- and canal builders, contractors, architects, surveyors,16
24The article on instrument maker Henry Maudslay is a page and a half, while that on civil engineer John Rennie
is over fourteen pages and William Jessop is nine pages.
25 These are: http://www.steamindex.com/people/engrs.htm; http://www.steamindex.com/people/civils.htm;
http://www.steamindex.com/manlocos/manulist.htm
26 The database was augmented with information from Crouzet (1985), Henderson (1954), Honeyman (1983),
Marsden (1895), Rimmer (1965), Sussman (2009), and Thorton (1959).
27 The DNB provides a high level of detail for some individuals, but as pointed out by MacLeod and Nuvolari
(2006), there is considerable selection bias in the DNB.
military engineers and similar occupations. While it covers some mechanical engineers, they clearly
were not the main interest of the editors.
24 It leaves out many areas, most notably chemicals, paper,
glass, food processing, and by and large textiles. It hence needs to be complemented with other
sources. Two other biographical compendia were used. One is Day and McNeil (1996), with high-
quality essays but with fairly thin coverage for Britain, since it is international in coverage.   There
are the various biographical studies carried out by Samuel Smiles (1865, 1884, 1889), which, despite
their hagiographic character, contain a lot of useful information about minor players as well. A
number of recently compiled online databases, overlapping to some extent with Skempton and Day-
McNeil were also used.
25 Finally, economic historians have carried out considerably detailed studies
of a number of industries that have produced information on many relatively minor actors in the
history of technological advances in the Industrial Revolution. Among the most notable and useful
of these studies, we should mention Turner (1998) and Morrison-Low (2007) on scientific
instruments; Burnley (1889), Heaton (1965), and Jenkins and Ponting (1982) on wool; Barlow
(1878) and Chapman (1967; 1972; 1981) on textiles; Barker and Harris (1954) on paper, glass and
chemical industries; Marshall (1978) on railroad engineers.
26 All entries were cross-checked and
complemented with information from the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.
27 To ensure the
accuracy of the number of patents, we verified the information in the bibliographies with the17
“Alphabetical index of patentees of inventions” by Woodcroft (1854), which includes all patents in
Great Britain until the reform of the patent system in 1851.
We include people born between 1660 and 1830. For each individual  we have recorded
beside the name and dates of birth and death, information about their education, their occupation,
what inventions and innovation they made, what rewards and pay they received, patents they took
out, publications, whether they were managers, employees, and/or self-employed (with or without
partners), membership in societies, and a variety of other details and remarks recorded in the
respective sources. Entries with unknown birthdates contain information when the person flourished
(fl.). We subtract 30 years from this date to calculate the date of birth.
Our database consists of 759 entries: 758 men and Elenor Coade, who invented a new
process for making artificial stone, and who is the only woman included in the database. We
assigned a sector to each individual by his main area of activity, which in some cases was difficult
because a large number of our tweakers were polymaths who applied their ability in many distinct
areas of activity and contributed materially to more than one sector. Hence 35 entries were assigned
to two different sectors with weight 1/2, hence the fractions in Table 1. 18
Table 1:  Tweaker-and-implementer database, descriptive statistics
Sector \ Period Pre-1700 1700-1749 1750-1774 1775-1799 1800- 1814 1815-1830 Sector Total
Textiles 2.0 39.0 41.0 42.0 45.0 24.0 193.0
Ships 1.0 3.0 7.5 7.5 6.0 2.0 27.0
Road & Rail & Can 2.0 2.0 11.5 26.5 24.5 23.0 89.5
Other Eng 11.0 19.0 32.5 44.0 27.0 14.5 148.0
Med & Chem 1.0 6.0 6.0 10.0 3.0 3.5 29.5
Instruments 8.0 26.0 12.0 27.0 12.0 5.5 90.5
Iron & Met 4.0 13.0 11.0 11.5 7.0 4.5 51.0
Mining 2.0 3.0 8.0 9.5 3.0 0.0 25.5
Agr & Farm 2.0 7.0 2.5 4.5 3.0 2.0 21.0
Constr 0.0 10.0 11.5 15.5 5.0 0.0 42.0
Print & Photo 0.0 4.0 4.5 6.5 2.5 2.0 19.5
Others 1.0 6.0 5.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 22.5
Period Total 34.0 138.0 153.0 208.0 142.0 84.0 759.0
% of Total 4.5% 18.2% 20.2% 27.4% 18.7% 11.1%
Table 1  displays the main descriptive statistics of the sample by birth-year and sector. The
number of persons included (per annum) peaks in the 1800-14 period, but this is largely because
many of those born in the fifteen years after 1815 were active in the second half of the nineteenth
century and much of what they did would not be included in many of our sources. The table reflects
the rise to prominence of the textile industry in the eighteenth century, yet it also warns that even
at its peak this industry did not involve more than a third of all tweakers, and for the sample as a
whole they are slightly under a quarter of the “modern” (that is, technologically advanced) economy.
Transportation and “other” engineering  together were larger than textiles, and many other sectors
were important areas for technological creativity.19
28Almost all the engineers who worked on the development of a locomotive from 1803 to 1830 were originally
employed in the mining sector. 
Results
Training: One important question is the training and education of highly skilled artisans. If
our argument that Britain’s advantage on other European countries derived primarily from its cadres
of skilled and creative tweakers, how should we explain that? How was this human capital created
and how were these artisans incentivized? The origins of the highly skilled labor force in Britain
have been discussed elsewhere, and need only briefly stated here (Mokyr, 2009a). On the demand
side, Britain had sectors that generated a need for a high level of skills, above all coal mining which
spawned the steam engine as well as the railroad (Cardwell, 1972, p. 74).
28 It had, for a variety of
reasons, a high number of clock- and instrument makers, optical craftsmen, millwrights, and workers
involved in shipbuilding and rigging. The origins of this group of high-skill workers were at least
in part due to geography; but the pre-existence of a substantial British middle class with a demand
for luxury goods meant a considerable market for consumer durables that required a high degree of
precision and skill, such as watches, telescopes, and musical instruments. Finally, Britain was the
beneficiary of the migration of Huguenots after 1685 and thus its more tolerant institutions can be
seen to have paid off. All the same, the main reason for the high levels of skills in this economy were
the effectiveness of its education system embedded in flexible labor markets. While the record of
British schools and universities was decidedly mixed,  skills were produced in the personal sphere
of master-apprentice relation, where British institutions performed remarkably well (Humphries,
2003; Mokyr, 2009a). 
The 759 persons in our sample confirm, as far as can be ascertained, this interpretation. Two
thirds of those whose educational background could be established were apprenticed. This share is20
29The two best-known inventors of the industry, Richard Arkwright and Edmund Cartwright  were trained as
a wigmaker and a clergyman respectively. But many others, insofar as we know their background, came from other
sectors. Henry Houldsworth (b. 1796), the inventor of compound gear in powerlooms, was trained as a grocer. Jedediah
Strutt, one of the early partners of Richard Arkwright, was trained as a wheelwright; his son of Jedediah (a successful
tweaker in his own right) had a wide-ranging education and among others was active as a successful architect. 
the highest in textiles, but the share of those about whom we do not know their educational
background is highest in textiles. Clearly this is the sector in which any kind of education mattered
the least, largely because the mechanical issues, while often subtle and delicate, required little
formal learning and success was often the result of a combination of dexterity, luck, perseverance,
and focus.
29 On the other hand, a quarter of our tweakers with known background had attended
University; many of these were upper class youngsters, some of whom turned into improving
landlords or the kind of  amateur inventors such as Lord Stanhope mentioned above. It may be safely
surmised that little of what they learned in English universities was of much help furthering their
technical competence, although the same was probably not true for Scottish universities.  Engineers,
whether in shipbuilding, railroads, canals, or mining usually apprenticed and/or attended a
university.  The same can be said about instrument makers. The consistency of the high proportion
of tweakers classified as engineers or instrument makers who were apprenticed leaves no doubt that
this mode of skills-transmission was the dominant form of human capital accumulation of the age.
Interestingly enough, the famous Statute of Apprentices and Artificers that mandated such training
was repealed in 1814, but the percentages of men born after 1800 who acquired their skills in this
fashion did not change and remained at about two-thirds of the entire sample of tweakers with
known educational background.  As a comparison of panels A and B of Table 2 shows, there is little
evidence that the role of formal education changed a lot in the training of the British technological
elite: the share of people with known training who attended universities fell from 27 to 24 percent
and those who only attended school only rose from 12 to 13 percent. 21
Table 2-A:  Sample breakdown by education, individuals born before 1800



















Textiles 19.5 16% 5.0 4% 1.5 1% 100.5 81% 124.0
Ships 10.0 53% 1.0 5% 5.5 29% 3.5 18% 19.0
Road & Rail & Can 19.0 45% 4.0 10% 7.0 17% 13.0 31% 42.0
Other Eng 42.0 39% 6.5 6% 22.5 21% 39.5 37% 106.5
Med & Chem 9.0 39% 2.0 9% 8.0 35% 5.0 22% 23.0
Instruments 38.0 52% 4.5 6% 15.5 21% 17.0 23% 73.0
Iron & Met 17.0 43% 4.5 11% 4.0 10% 15.0 38% 39.5
Mining 13.0 58% 1.5 7% 3.0 13% 6.0 27% 22.5
Agr & Farm 3.5 22% 1.0 6% 7.0 44% 5.0 31% 16.0
Constr 17.0 46% 4.0 11% 2.5 7% 13.5 36% 37.0
Print & Photo 9.0 60% 1.0 7% 2.5 17% 3.5 23% 15.0
Others 5.0 32% 2.0 13% 2.0 13% 6.5 42% 15.5
Category Total 202.0 38% 37.0 7% 81.0 15% 228.0 43% 533.0
Notes:
1. Apprenticed + School + University > Known background due to overlaps
Table 2-B:  Sample breakdown by education, individuals born 1800-1830



















Textiles 14.0 20% 1.0 1% 0.5 1% 54.0 78% 69.0
Ships 4.0 50% 2.0 25% 2.0 25% 0.0 0% 8.0
Road & Rail & Can 36.0 76% 3.0 6% 4.0 8% 6.5 14% 47.5
Other Eng 25.5 61% 5.0 12% 9.0 22% 5.5 13% 41.5
Med & Chem 1.5 23% 1.0 15% 4.0 62% 0.0 0% 6.5
Instruments 6.0 34% 2.0 11% 6.0 34% 5.0 29% 17.5
Iron & Met 4.5 39% 2.0 17% 4.0 35% 1.0 9% 11.5
Mining 1.0 33% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 2.0 67% 3.0
Agr & Farm 0.5 10% 0.0 0% 1.0 20% 3.5 70% 5.0
Constr 1.5 30% 1.0 20% 2.0 40% 0.5 10% 5.0
Print & Photo 1.5 33% 0.0 0% 2.5 56% 1.0 22% 4.5
Others 5.0 71% 2.0 29% 0.0 0% 2.0 29% 7.0
Category Total 101.0 45% 19.0 8% 35.0 15% 81.0 36% 226.0
Notes:
1. Apprenticed + School + University > Known background due to overlaps
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30Among them the microscope-makers George Adams Sr. and Jr. active in the second half of the eighteenth
century; John Rastrick (1738-1826) and his son John Urpeth Rastrick (1780-1856), both civil engineers; the hugely
inventive and versatile engineer Bryan Donkin ((1768–1855) and his son and later partner John (1802–1854); the
engineers William (1762-1834)  and James (1795-1862) Sims. 
31Goethe wrote that the British patent system's great merit was that it turned invention into a "real possession,
and thereby avoids all annoying disputes concerning the honor due" (cited in  Klemm, 1964, p. 173). Some modern
economic historians have agreed with him, however ( North and  Thomas, 1973, p. 156). In his Lectures on
Jurisprudence ([1757], 1978), pp. 11, 83, 472), Adam  Smith argued that intellectual property rights were "actually real
rights" and admitted that the patent system was the one monopoly (or "priviledge" as he called it) he could live with,
The apprenticeship system clearly figured highly in the creation of British competence. The modes
of cultural transmission, as so often happens, can be seen in the creation of “dynasties” in which
technical knowledge was passed on along vertical lines. Some famous father-and-son dynasties, such
as the Darby’s, the Stephensons, and the Brunels are widely known. But there were many others.
30
Of the dynasties of master-apprentices, the best-known is the Bramah-Maudsley-Nasmyth one.
Especially among coal viewers, a highly skilled and specialized branch of mining engineering, such
dynasties were common: John Blenkinsop (1783-1831) was trained by Thomas Barnes (1765-1801),
who himself was trained by an (unknown) viewer. 
Incentives. How were these members of Britain's technological elite incentivized? There were
essentially four different mechanisms through which these men were compensated: intellectual
property rights in their knowledge; first mover advantage by independent businesses; reputation
effects leading to permanent employment; and non-pecuniary rewards. We shall discuss those in
turn.
Intellectual Property Rights. A standard argument in the literature has been that the patent system
in Britain provided the most effective incentive toward invention. This view is not just found in the
writings of modern institutionalists such as Douglass North (1981) but also in many of contemporary
writers, many of them hugely influential such as Adam Smith and Goethe.
31 But the high cost of23
because it left the decision on the merit of an invention to the market rather than to officials.
32For a number of inventors this is well-known. For example William Murdoch, who took out three patents for
minor advances but failed to patent more important inventions. Henry Maudslay, one the great mechanical engineers of
his age, had six patents to his name but did not patent his micrometer or any screw cutting invention for which he was
famous. Among lesser-known people, a striking example is William Froude (1810-1879), a ship designer and inventor
of the helicoidal skew arch bridge on ships, yet his only patent is a railroad valve patented in 1848; John Benjamin
MacNeill (1792-1880) a road engineer who worked for Telford, and took out three patents but failed to patent his best
invention, which was an instrument to be drawn along roads, to indicate their state of repair by monitoring the deflections
produced by irregularities in the road surface
33One reason was the likely payoff. The ratio between alternative means of cashing in on an invention relative
to patenting was one consideration. The cost of issuing a patent before 1851 was very substantial and may simply have
been unaffordable or simply unlikely to be covered by the returns relative to keeping the invention details secret. The
likelihood of a patent being upheld in court also differed substantially by sector.  However, in some sectors - especially
engineering - the culture of the profession was quite hostile to the patent system.  
patenting in Britain before the patent reform of 1851 assured that most of the smaller inventions (and
many of the larger ones) were not patented (MacLeod, 1988; Griffiths, Hunt and O'Brien, 1992;
Mokyr, 2009b). Many inventors, especially those who were trained as scientists, were averse to the
monopolistic nature of patent rights and felt that useful knowledge should be shared and that access
to it and the use of it should not be limited in any way. Others were more ambivalent and
circumspect about the patent system and patented some of their inventions while conspicuously
failing to patent others.
32
Given that complete patent records exist, we were able to to check how many of our sample
took out patents at all. As Table 3 indicates, for the entire period 40 percent of our tweakers never
took out a patent. The interpretation of this table is rather tricky: all we can tell is that a person in
our sample took out a particular patent. As Dutton (1984), MacLeod (1988) and many others have
pointed out, there were major differences in the propensities to patent between different sectors, for
a variety of reasons.
33 Textiles turn out to be a high-patenting sector, in part perhaps because reverse
engineering was fairly easy. In fact, "one thing that all these textile machines have in common is that
they satisfy Bacon's criterion for a certain kind of invention: they incorporated no principles,24
34Different findings for textiles are not only observed for Britain, the technological leader, but also for
technological followers. Becker, Hornung, and Woessmann (2009), studying the impact of literacy on technology
adaption in Prussia - a technological follower, find that literacy foster industrialization in all sectors but textiles. The
authors argue that the incremental nature of technological change in textiles leads to more sector-specific knowledge that
cannot be acquired through formal education.
35As a consequence, studies that see the textile industry as a typical Industrial Revolution sector in terms of its
intellectual property rights development such as Griffiths, Hunt and O'Brien (1992) are likely to be misleading. 
materials or processes that would have puzzled Archimedes" (Cardwell 1994, pp. 185-86). Even
without extensive mechanical knowledge improvements could be made and especially in cotton
small changes in the production process led to huge improvements in the product's quality.
34  Hence
the payoff of inventing and patenting in textiles was perceived to be high. The propensity of
patenting in textiles was also higher because constructing and improving textiles machinery required
different but not necessarily sophisticated mechanical skills. The textiles sector therefore attracted
relatively fewer people much associated with science who had been much affected with the
"open-source" scientific culture that viewed knowledge to be a public good and objected to patenting
as a matter of principle. As a result, only 19 percent of all tweakers active primarily in textiles never
took out a single patent, compared to 40 percent for the economy as a whole.
35 Most of our tweakers
are fairly minor players in the patent game, and so of the people who patented at all, 83 percent
patented fewer than 5 inventions. All the same, our sample does include 78 individuals who had six
or more patents to their name. Some of these may have been "professional inventors" but others
simply were in a position  to take advantage of the patent system. 
None of this implies that patenting was a particularly successful ex post strategy. Securing
a patent even on an economic viable invention did not ensure economic success. Patents were
frequently challenged, infringed, or voided. In our data, even individuals who took out patents for
some inventions failed to do so for others, and the patents they took out, especially before 1830,
proved to provide little protection against infringers and challengers - especially if the invention25
36 Thus the Scottish inventor George Meikle, son of the inventor of the threshing machine, took out a patent for
a "scutching machine" (with his father) but the patent was repeatedly challenged and infringed upon and eventually
abandoned. Nathaniel Worsdell (1809-1886) patented a device to sort mailbags in 1838, but the Post Office introduced
a competing device that infringed on his invention; Worsdell refused to sue because his Quaker beliefs would not permit
it (Birse, 2004). 
37John Kay, the inventor of the “flying shuttle” was effectively ruined trying to defend his patents. Disillusioned
he moved to France in 1747 after failing to maintain patents right in England. Similarly, Henry Fourdrinier’s continuous
papermaking machine was shamelessly copied and he could never recover the £60,000 he and his brother had spent on
the innovation. To circumvent infringement, James Beaumont Neilson (1792–1865), the inventor of the hot blast in iron
manufacture (1829), issued licenses at 1 shilling per ton. Neilson and his partners hoped to make the patent remunerative,
but sell it at a fee low enough to prevent widespread evasion or attacks on the patent's validity. Nevertheless the patent
was disputed.
proved profitable.
36 Judges were often unsympathetic to patentees, reflecting to a large extent the
Table 3: Patentees breakdown, by sector (number of patents issued)
Sector \              























Textiles 37.0 19% 64.0 33% 71.0 37% 9.0 5% 12.0 6% 193.0
Ships 8.0 30% 9.0 33% 7.5 28% 2.5 9% 0.0 0% 27.0
Road & Rail &
Can
50.0 56% 17.5 20% 16.5 18% 4.0 4% 1.5 2% 89.5
Other Eng 57.0 39% 32.0 22% 29.5 20% 20.0 14% 9.5 6% 148.0
Med & Chem 12.0 41% 11.0 37% 4.5 15% 0.0 0% 2.0 7% 29.5
Instruments 59.0 65% 16.0 18% 12.0 13% 0.5 1% 3.0 3% 90.5
Iron & Met 15.0 29% 11.5 23% 20.5 40% 2.0 4% 2.0 4% 51.0
Mining 15.0 59% 7.0 27% 2.5 10% 1.0 4% 0.0 0% 25.5
Agr & Farm 10.0 48% 5.5 26% 4.5 21% 1.0 5% 0.0 0% 21.0
Constr 27.5 65% 6.5 15% 5.5 13% 1.0 2% 1.5 4% 42.0
Print & Photo 7.5 38% 2.0 10% 4.5 23% 2.0 10% 3.5 18% 19.5
Others 6.0 27% 10.0 44% 6.5 29% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 22.5
Category Total 304.0 40% 192.0 25% 185.0 24% 43.0 6% 35.0 5% 759.0
suspiciousness of the age of anything that reeked of monopoly. Tales of inventors ruined by patent
suits at this time are legion, and it is  reasonable to surmise that given their cost, the mean rate of
return may have been negative.
37 One might then legitimately ask why people kept applying for
patents, and a number of replies can be given, among them the “lottery effect” (a small number of26
38Of course, some patentees such as the metal manufacturer William Champion, worded their patents in as
obscure a manner as possible to try to prevent infringement. 
39Modern entrepreneurs face the same choices. Much like their counterparts during the industrial revolution,
they rely on first mover advantage, secrecy, and patents to capture the competitive advantage. Graham et al. (2009),
examining entrepreneurs in the high-technology sector using the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, show at the only sector
in which entrepreneurs find patents more important than first mover advantages is Biotechnology — a sector that
arguably did not exist during the Industrial Revolution. Secrecy is rated almost as important as patents.
highly visible successful patents may have created a false ex ante belief that they were more
profitable than they were in reality) and a “signaling effect” (inventors took out patents to indicate
to would-be financiers that their invention was worthwhile and secure) (Mokyr, 2009b).
Interestingly enough, British society realized how imperfect the patent was, and some of the big
inventors who, for some reason, did not patent or whose patent failed, were compensated by
Parliament or by grateful colleagues. But such grants were awarded to technological superstars, not
to tweakers who made a minor improvement.
Secrecy was a viable alternative to patenting. Some tweakers relied on secrecy to secure a
competitive advantage and to avoid costly legal battles. There was Sir Titus Salt (1803-1876) , a
textiles manufacturer, who overcame problems in utilizing alpaca wool, who never patented his
processes but kept them as trade secrets. This strategy made him the richest citizen in Bradford. John
Braithwaite, Sr, in the business of retrieving goods from sunken shipwrecks, kept his improved
diving machine, his machinery for sawing apart ships underwater, and his underwater gunpowder
charges under lock and key and never took out a patent (which would have made him divulge his
knowledge).
38 Joseph Gillot, a pen manufacturer and the Pen Maker to the Queen, also preferred
secrecy for years before taking out patents and the masticating process — a process in the
production of rubber invented by Thomas Hancock — was also never patented, but remained as a
secret in the factory.  For others, of course, secrecy was a risky strategy, such as the famous case of
Benjamin Huntsman, the inventor of crucible steel whose secret eventually leaked out.
3927
40Some of them were successful employees who then tried to go into business for themselves; other had the
reverse career and were failed entrepreneurs who then took a job with another firm. 
First-mover and reputation effects.  Signaling quality to potential costumers and outshining the
competition was crucial to ensure the economic success of the woman and men in our sample. As
Table 4 shows, most of our tweakers were at least for some part of their careers self-employed: A
full 385 (51 percent of our sample and 64 percent of all those whose means of livelihood could be
established) were identifiable  entrepreneurs and independent operators or consultants, owning or
establishing a company at some point. Another 82 (11 percent) were owners at least some of their
careers.
40 A respectable 18 percent were hired engineers and managers. Again, it is striking how
exceptional textiles were as an industry: for a considerable number of individuals, we were unable
to establish exactly the way in which they made their living. But for the entire rest of the sample,
of those for whom we could establish these facts, we found that 68 percent were owners and
independent contractors throughout their careers, and another 16 percent were so through part of
their career. Given that only few of those had successful patents, better quality of product and
services leaning on reputation effects were central to economic success.28






































Textiles 58.5 30% 5.5 3% 3.0 2% 6.5 3% 119.5 62%
193.
0
Ships 17.5 65% 3.5 13% 0.0 0% 5.0 19% 1.0 4% 27.0
Road & Rail &
Can
36.0 40% 26.0 29% 21.0 23% 5.5 6% 1.0 1% 89.5
Other Eng 84.0 57% 19.5 13% 9.0 6% 26.0 18% 9.5 6%
148.
0
Med & Chem 16.5 56% 3.0 10% 0.0 0% 8.0 27% 2.0 7% 29.5
Instruments 54.0 60% 7.0 8% 0.0 0% 17.5 19% 12.0 13% 90.5
Iron & Met 38.5 75% 4.5 9% 1.0 2% 2.0 4% 5.0 10% 51.0
Mining 9.5 37% 5.0 20% 4.0 16% 5.0 20% 2.0 8% 25.5
Agr & Farm 12.5 60% 1.0 5% 1.5 7% 1.0 5% 5.0 24% 21.0
Constr 30.0 71% 4.0 10% 3.0 7% 3.0 7% 2.0 5% 42.0
Print & Photo 16.5 85% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 3.0 15% 0.0 0% 19.5
Others 11.5 51% 3.0 13% 0.5 2% 5.5 24% 2.0 9% 22.5




1. "Owners (full-time)" category includes independent contractor, entrepreneur, self-employed, manager/owner with or without
partner
2. "Owners (part-time)” category includes inventors that were owners and managers/employees at the same time at different
companies or at different points in their lifetimes
The centrality of first-mover advantage is hard to document in a systematic way, but
examples abound. In the textile industry, first-mover advantage was common: Arkwright’s patent
was voided, but his technological advantage was such that he died a wealthy man. Others were able
to cash in on fairly minor advantages. An example can be seen in the hosiery industry, where
Jedediah Strutt came up in the 1750s  with a major improvement to lace made on stocking frames,
subsequently improved further by the idea of the “point net.” The idea of this more efficient method
was conceived by one Mr. Flint, who hired a Thomas Taylor of Nottingham to build it for him, who
then acquired the invention and patented it. Years later, the point net was further improved by29
41The great instrument makers of the age mostly seem to fall into that category. Thus John Bird (1709–76)
supplied instruments to Greenwich Observatory as well as to the one in Stockholm. Bird established in 1745 his own
workshop in London making machine tools and small mathematical instruments. He received orders to design and make
large astronomical instruments for major observatories at home and abroad. Two generations after him, Robert Bretell
Bate (1782-1847) was appointed optician to King George I, an honor that was renewed on the accessions of William IV
and Queen Victoria; he won government contracts with a number of government agencies. By 1820, his workshop
employed twenty employees  (McConnell, 2004a; 2004b).
William Hayne, whose patent was declared invalid in 1810 (Felkin, 1867, pp. 133-41). 



















Textiles 58.5 30% 5.5 3% 55.5 87% 193.0
Ships 17.5 65% 3.5 13% 10.0 48% 27.0
Road & Rail &
Can
36.0 40% 26.0 29% 25.0 40% 89.5
Other Eng 84.0 57% 19.5 13% 54.0 52% 148.0
Med & Chem 16.5 56% 3.0 10% 7.0 36% 29.5
Instruments 54.0 60% 7.0 8% 31.5 52% 90.5
Iron & Met 38.5 75% 4.5 9% 29.5 69% 51.0
Mining 9.5 37% 5.0 20% 9.0 62% 25.5
Agr & Farm 12.5 60% 1.0 5% 6.0 44% 21.0
Constr 30.0 71% 4.0 10% 11.5 34% 42.0
Print & Photo 16.5 85% 0.0 0% 8.5 52% 19.5
Others 11.5 51% 3.0 13% 9.5 66% 22.5
Category Total 385.0 51% 82.0 11% 257.0 55% 759.0
 Many of the great clock- and instrument makers of the age, a pivotal group in the realization of the
Industrial Revolution, were essentially self-employed and depended on reputation for quality and
reliability.
41  John Kennedy, co-owner of M’Connel and  Kennedy, one of the most successful cotton
spinners in Manchester, made a number of adjustments to the fine-spinning capabilities of the mule
which allowed a much higher count (finer) yarn to be spun. Kennedy never took out a patent.  In
1826 Kennedy retired from one of the best-known and prosperous enterprises in the Industrial
Revolution. Another striking case was that of Joseph Aspdin, the inventor of Portland cement.30
42Johnson, who lived from 1811 to 1911, remained a major player in the British cement industry for much of
his life, and thus perhaps exemplifies the benefits of second-mover advantage. 
Although he did take out a patent in 1824, his advantage was relatively brief. His son, William
Aspdin, was the first to invent true “Portland Cement” in the early 1840s, by discovering the
necessity of clinkering (grinding the product of the cement kilns and adding gypsum) but did not
patent it. William’s early-mover advantage did last long because others such as Isaac Charles
Johnson were following his idea on his heels. After two years, Johnson was able to develop a
superior product, and yet Aspdin’s advantage in time was enough to assure him financial success
for a while, although in 1855 he went bankrupt and his works were sold to Johnson (Francis, 1977,
pp. 116–25, 151–58).
42
For many of our tweakers, being innovative and able to tweak technology in use, was part
of the job description. Innovation meant job security for employees or new commissions for the self-
employed. James Watt employed a number of highly creative engineers, most of all the ingenious
William Murdoch.  Railway companies expected their locomotive pool managers to invent in order
to cut cost, improve the quality of transportation, and deal with excessive smoke emissions. Hence
for railroad engineers like Charles Markham, who adjusted fire holes in locomotives for the use of
coal, innovative activity that adapted existing techniques to specific purposes was simply taken for
granted and reflected in their comfortable salaries. 
Innovativeness was a strong signal of competence, and competence was what people hiring
consultants wanted. Self-employed engineers such as James Brindley and John Rennie, or architects
like Joseph Jopling, (who won a Society of Arts gold medal for arch construction improvements),
made their living by signaling their professional competence through coming up with improvements
in the techniques they used. This, too, was a function of the patent office: having taken out a patent31
43Studying the motivations for patenting of present day entrepreneurs, Graham et al. (2009) find that enhancing
the company’s reputation and improving chances of securing investment or additional financing are still important
reasons for entrepreneurs to take out patents.
44It is interesting to note that for modern data hiring inventive employees seems also a good strategy to
maximize the impact of innovations. Singh and Agrawal (2010) estimate (using modern US patent citation data) that
when firm recruit inventors, the citation of the new recruits’ prior inventions increases by more than 200 percent even
if these patents are held by their previous employer. They also argue that the effect is persistent even though one might
expect that the tacit knowledge of the inventor diffuses fast within a firm.
45Thus Bryan Donkin, a prodigiously gifted tweaker, with 11 patents to his name and a reputation to match,
received commissions from the excise and stamp ofice, the East India office and none other than Charles Babbage (to
estimate the cost of building his calculating machine). 
was seen, whether correctly or not, as an official imprimatur of technological expertise.
43 Reputation
for expertise resulted in new commissions for their workshops.
44 Again, it is not easy to quantify
this, but professional engineers, especially civil and mechanical engineers, often worked on specific
commissions and consultancies. 
Some of these commissions came from the government, others from overseas, but most of
them were local manufacturers and colliers who needed something specific installed or built.
45 The
model for this way of organizing the engineering profession was set by the great John Smeaton, after
James Watt the most influential engineer of the eighteenth century. Smeaton took out but one patent
in his life, despite a vast number of inventions and improvements, but he was in huge demand as a
consulting engineer, and in fact is often said to have established engineering consultancy as a formal
profession. As table 4-B shows, more than half of the independent contractors and self-employed
had partners (at some stage), although that proportion was especially high in textiles, iron,  and
mining and a bit lower elsewhere. 
For the self-employed artisans and independent engineers who would be in the group of
tweakers and implementers, the reward was first and foremost a reputation for competence that led
to customers and commissions and in some case the patronage of a rich or powerful person. Many32
46 Consider the career of Edward John Dent (1790-1853), who won a first Premium Award at the Seventh
Annual Trial of Chronometers (1829) and then won the esteem of Sir George Airy, the Astronomer Royal, who
recommended him as the maker of a large clock for the tower of the new Royal Exchange. Dent later enjoyed the
patronage of Queen Victoria, the Royal Navy and the Czar of Russia. In 1852 he won the commission to make the Big
Ben for the Houses of Parliament at Westminster, but he died before completing the project.
47Telford, in his design for an all-iron bridge over the Thames to replace London Bridge (which was not built),
hired a young engineer named James Douglas, whose mechanical genius earned him the epithet “the Eskdale
Archimedes. Douglas was a versatile engineer who had attracted the notice of the British Ambassador in the US, who
paid his expenses home to England “ so that his services might not be lost to his country.” In 1799 it is known that
Douglas worked for Telford, but then absconded to France in around 1802. Telford disapprovingly remarked that
Douglas was “always too impatient for distinction and wealth, in the race for which in his country he found too many
competitors.” 
of the engineers and best mechanics in the Industrial Revolution were engaged in a signaling game:
in a market with imperfect information about quality, establishing a reputation for skills was a key
to economic security if not perhaps to extraordinary riches.  This was true for the superstar engineers
in the Industrial Revolution such as John Rennie and John Smeaton, but it was equally true for
lesser-known people. For many of the best mechanics and engineers reputations meant well-paying
positions in good firms or tickets for commissions and contracts. Reputation and being in very high
standing among one’s professional peers could lead to cash awards from the government (who relied
on expert opinion in making these awards). Such cash prizes were also awarded by some private
societies (such as the Society of Arts, founded in 1754). These awards were often financially
significant, and with any of these rewards the reputation of an inventor grew. It was also associated
with peer recognition and social prestige associated with mechanical achievement to a degree never
before witnessed.
46 Some engineers became technological authorities and their imprimatur could
make or break the career of a young engineer. Among those authorities, John Smeaton and Thomas
Telford were the towering figures during the Industrial Revolution.
47 
Not all cash prizes or medals were given for meeting specified criteria such as the famed
Board of Longitude award made to John Harrison for his marine chronometer. Cash reward were33
also given to inventors in the public service like the civil engineer and road builder John Loudon
McAdam, who received £6,000 from public funds for his improvements on the British road system;
to Edward Jenner, for his spectacular discovery of smallpox vaccination; to Sir Francis Pettit Smith
who was awarded £20,000 by the Admiralty for his screw propeller; and to William Symington who
received £100 from Parliament for the first steam boat. As noted, in few cases such awards were
regarded as a correction to an often-malfunctioning patent system. Sir Thomas Lombe the inventor
(really importer) of mechanized silk spinning technology, was awarded £14,000 as a special
dispensation in 1732 in lieu of a renewal of his patent. Of the “heroes of the Industrial Revolution,”
Samuel Crompton, Edmund Cartwright, and Henry Fourdrinier were among those who, after much
haggling, were voted an award. 
Reputation effects were often international: as noted already, many British engineers and
mechanics found positions on the Continent or received commissions and assignments from
overseas, as one would expect in an economy that was more richly endowed with competence than
its neighbors and were often honored by them. Charles Gascoigne, the manager of the Scottish
Carron ironworks in the 1760 received a lucrative commission from the Russian government in
1786; ironmaster John Wilkinson’s brother William was commissioned by the French government
to set up the ironworks at Le Creuzot. In the nineteenth century this process  continued with renewed
force. Richard Roberts, perhaps the most ingenious tweaker of his generation, was invited to help
install cotton-spinning machinery in Mulhouse. William Fairbairn (1789–1874), another leading
engineer and one of the pioneers of the iron-hulled ships, consulted in Turkey, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands. Robert Whitehead, a ship designer who made major improvements to the design of the34
48To be sure, nine textile engineers were elevated to an aristocratic title, which, at 5 percent, is only marginally
below the overall mean of 7 percent. But these were men such as Richard Arkwright, James Oldknow, and Robert Peel,
who were rewarded for a successful career as entrepreneurs. 
torpedo, started his career as a naval designer working for the Austrian government and gathered
a great many foreign decorations including a French  Legion d’honneur.
Nonpecuniary rewards  Many of the cutting edge inventors and tweakers of the age professed to be
uninterested in financial rewards. Economists are trained to regard such statements with suspicion,
but that it is not to say that considerations other than money did not play a role. The distinction is
hard to make because prizes, medals, and other distinctions operated as signals of quality and thus
enhanced reputations that themselves were correlated with patronage (steady employment) or
commissions. A few “cash” prizes were also to a large extent honorary, much like book prizes today.
Such rewards took a variety of forms. Some associations appointed “fellows” (the Royal Academy
being the primary example), others such as the Society of Arts, organized competitions and awarded
medals and other distinctions for technological achievements. In Britain, of course, the highest
distinction that could be awarded to someone of a working class origin was an honorary aristocratic
title.   Table 5 summarizes the awards earned by our sample.
The data show a considerable variation in the number of medals awarded. In textiles, medals
were rare, and it seems to have been the one industry in which monetary considerations were
probably more or less the main incentive.
48 The categories are overlapping, so quite a few people
received more than one reward. All the same, the data show that for tweakers in fields such as civil
engineering, instrument-making, construction, and to a lesser extent metallurgy, such prizes were
a reality, and the probability of earning such a prize was far more likely than actually cashing in on
a patent (and there was no application fee). There can be little question that, as with all such prizes,35
personal connections and background played a role. Indeed, in a recent paper Khan (2010) has
concluded  that “In Britain the most decisive determinants for whether the inventor received a prize
were which particular university he had graduated from and membership in the Royal Society of
Arts, characteristics that seem to have been somewhat uncorrelated with technological productivity.
Thus, rather than being calibrated to the value of the inventor’s contributions, prizes to British
inventors appear to have been largely determined by noneconomic considerations.” One could, of
course quibble with how to measure “technological productivity” (to say nothing of the distinction
between economic and non-economic considerations). But what counts here is that the probability
 Table 5-A:  Cash prizes and non-pecuniary rewards, individuals born before 1800

























Textiles 3.0 2% 8.0 6% 3.0 2% 5.0 4% 2.0 2% 124.0
Ships 3.5 18% 5.5 29% 0.5 3% 0.5 3% 4.5 24% 19.0
Road & Rail &
Can
1.0 2% 3.0 7% 2.0 5% 4.5 11% 5.5 13% 42.0
Other Eng 19.0 18% 5.5 5% 8.5 8% 11.5 11% 21.0 20% 106.5
Med & Chem 4.0 17% 2.5 11% 0.5 2% 2.5 11% 7.5 33% 23.0
Instruments 18.5 25% 11.5 16% 2.0 3% 24.0 33% 31.0 42% 73.0
Iron & Met 1.0 3% 1.0 3% 3.0 8% 3.0 8% 5.0 13% 39.5
Mining 2.0 9% 1.0 4% 0.0 0% 2.0 9% 3.0 13% 22.5
Agr & Farm 1.0 6% 2.0 13% 1.5 9% 0.0 0% 0.5 3% 16.0
Constr 7.5 20% 4.0 11% 1.5 4% 8.0 22% 5.0 14% 37.0
Print & Photo 1.0 7% 2.0 13% 2.0 13% 2.0 13% 3.0 20% 15.0
Others 3.5 23% 1.0 6% 1.5 10% 4.0 26% 3.0 19% 15.5
Category Total 65.0 12% 47.0 9% 26.0 5% 67.0 13% 91.0 17% 533.036





























Textiles 3.0 4% 0.5 1% 6.0 9% 3.5 5% 0.5 1% 69.0
Ships 1.0 13% 0.0 0% 2.0 25% 1.0 13% 2.0 25% 8.0
Road & Rail &
Can
1.0 2% 0.0 0% 3.0 6% 5.5 12% 5.0 11% 47.5
Other Eng 14.0 34% 5.5 13% 8.0 19% 7.0 17% 10.5 25% 41.5
Med & Chem 2.0 31% 0.0 0% 4.0 62% 1.0 15% 3.5 54% 6.5
Instruments 7.0 40% 0.5 3% 2.5 14% 8.5 49% 3.5 20% 17.5
Iron & Met 5.0 43% 1.0 9% 3.0 26% 1.0 9% 3.0 26% 11.5
Mining 0.0 0% 1.0 33% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 1.0 33% 3.0
Agr & Farm 1.0 20% 1.0 20% 1.0 20% 0.0 0% 1.0 20% 5.0
Constr 1.0 20% 0.0 0% 0.5 10% 0.5 10% 0.0 0% 5.0
Print & Photo 3.0 67% 1.0 22% 0.0 0% 1.0 22% 1.0 22% 4.5
Others 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 2.0 29% 0.0 0% 7.0
Category Total 38.0 17% 10.5 5% 30.0 13% 31.0 14% 31.0 14% 226.0
of winning such a social recognition was non-zero and correlated with some achievement even if
the correlation was not as high as one would wish in a perfect world. It stands to reason that in such
distinctions, then as now, accomplishment and personal connections were complementary. As such,
there can be little doubt that these institutions provided a considerable incentive for technically
brilliant and industrious men. Networking counted too — but such networks by themselves held
considerable technological advantages. 
Were Tweakers Enlightened?
The Baconian program alluded to before was a product of the Enlightenment, and it
emphasized the diffusion and dissemination of useful knowledge in addition to its creation (Mokyr,
2009a). That such beliefs were held by some of the leading figures of the Industrial Revolution such37
49The perhaps most striking example is the instrument maker  Edward Troughton (1753-1835). Having kept one
crucial method of his dividing machine secret, he later wrote a description for the Astronomer Royal as a “valuable
present to young craftsmen.”  The paper was read to the Royal Society,  which earned him a Copley medal and opened
all doors to him. 
50The Ladies Diary was edited between 1714 and 1743 by the surveyor, engineer, mathematician, and
paradigmatic tweaker, Henry Beighton (1683-1743). 
51For instance, Edmund Beckett Grimthorpe, who used gravity escapes in public watches, published his
knowledge on watch making in A Rudimentary Treatise on Clocks and Watchmaking and William Jones shared the
insights he gained with his improved solar telescope in The Description and Use of a New Portable Orrery.
as Josiah Wedgwood, Matthew Boulton,  and Benjamin Gott has long been known. But Robert Allen
(see Allen 2009a) has questioned the degree to which such beliefs were common in the wider
population of technologically relevant people. It is, of course, impossible to verify, with few
exceptions, what these people believed about what they were doing. But we can see to which extent
they tried to network by joining a variety of professional societies, or bring their knowledge to a
wide audience by publishing. Again, such actions could be explained by other factors. Publishing,
for example, served as a signal of expertise and respectability, and professional societies were social
as well as professional networks.
49
The measures are, of course, not independent. Inventions, new methods, and explanation
were published in the journals edited by professional societies, such as the Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society or Transactions of the Institution of Civil Engineers. Membership
and rewards in some professional societies were granted for papers read to them. Some of our
tweakers participated in public debates or provided descriptions and puzzles for the Ladies’ Diary,
an eighteenth century  journal aimed at the “fair” sex explaining improvements in the Arts and
Sciences.
50 Beyond articles, many of our tweakers published treatises and books on matters of new
technology.
51
All the same, the fact that engineers and mechanics were networked and interacted in this38
fashion, if sufficiently widespread, indicates that the Industrial Revolution took place in a different
cultural environment than the one that prevailed at the time of the Glorious Revolution. It should
be added that the estimates presented in Table 6 are lower bounds; the absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence, and especially for some of our more obscure tweakers it has been hard to
unearth all the evidence of their exploits. Many may have been members of small provincial
intellectual societies and published in obscure provincial journals or anonymously. At the same time,
we acknowledge that because of the way the sample was constructed, it may suffer from selection





















Textiles 7.5 4% 6.0 3% 3.0 2% 193.0
Ships 6.5 24% 2.0 7% 11.0 41% 27.0
Road & Rail & Can 11.0 12% 29.5 33% 23.0 26% 89.5
Other Eng 25.0 17% 31.0 21% 55.0 37% 148.0
Med & Chem 4.0 14% 3.5 12% 13.5 46% 29.5
Instruments 13.0 14% 13.5 15% 40.5 45% 90.5
Iron & Met 6.5 13% 9.0 18% 6.5 13% 51.0
Mining 4.5 18% 3.0 12% 8.0 31% 25.5
Agr & Farm 6.5 31% 1.5 7% 3.5 17% 21.0
Construction 8.0 19% 2.5 6% 18.0 43% 42.0
Print & Photo 3.0 15% 2.5 13% 4.0 21% 19.5
Others 1.5 7% 1.0 4% 5.0 22% 22.5
Category Total 97.0 13% 105.0 14% 191.0 25% 759.0
bias in the sense that engineers and inventors of the second and third tier may have been in the sample
because either publication or membership left a record and thus ended up in our sample.
Again, the data show that of all sectors, textiles on which Allen relies heavily were the39
52John Mercer (1791-1866), like many other leading figures in the technological elite,  was a member of the
Anti-Corn Law League. Others spent their time and money on the improvement of society, like the garden architect John
Claudius Loudon, who supported a scheme for decent housing for the poor or toolmaker and engineer Joseph Whitworth
who devoted various sums, amounting in all to £594,416, to educational and charitable purposes. Sir George Cayley
(1773–1857), the famous aeronautic pioneer, was a  Whig Member of Parliament for Scarborough, and strongly
supported Parliamentary reform and abolition. 
exception. It was the “least enlightened” and thus any inferences about the Industrial Revolution
based primarily on the technological history of textiles may be misleading. Only about 10 percent of
the individuals in textiles either published, belonged to a professional society, or both.  For the
sample as a whole, however, 52 percent of all tweakers were enlightened in the sense defined above.
Indeed, roughly speaking,  around two-thirds of all engineers in our sample either published or
belonged to scientific or technical societies. The shortcoming of our sources notwithstanding,
therefore, it is fair to say that an Enlightenment culture was rooted deeply in the top 3-5 percentile
of the skill distribution – the highly competent craftsmen and engineers. 
Not only did our tweakers place their knowledge in the public sphere and participated in
discussions in formal societies, but although like most engineers anywhere they had limited interest
in politics, quite a few were involved in liberal or progressive politics of one kind or another.
52 Some
of our engineers such as Richard Reynolds, an ironmonger, can be shown to have been active in the
anti-slavery movement. To be sure, the Enlightenment meant different things to different people, and
its influence on wider British society was limited before the 1830s. However, it was an elite ideology,
and our tweaker sample was drawn from an elite population. The technological momentum in the
Industrial Revolution was supplied by a small, elite group of highly skilled engineers, artisans, and
workmen. Our sample represents the right tail of this group, the most successful and highly skilled
members of an elite, yet their characteristics tell us a lot about the sources of British success. 
To what extent were our tweakers different from the better-known “superstars” of the40
Industrial Revolution? The issue is relevant because of the assumption of “continuity” in the
distribution we are making (since we are observing a highly selective sample). To test for this, we
selected 72 members of our sample who are mentioned in two recent books on the Industrial
Revolution by one of us, namely Mokyr (1990 and 2002). That yielded 72 names of such
technological luminaries as Arkwright, Watt, Smeaton, Wedgwood and Trevithick. We checked to
what extent they resembled the rest of the sample. As they were obvious the very top of the
competence distribution, more is known of them. Yet they appear to be, on the whole, much like the
rest of our sample, if naturally more distinguished and more likely to be owners-entrepreneurs (see
Table 7). It is worth noting that while superstars hold, on average, more patents, a full 25 percent of
the superstars did not patent all of their inventions.41
TABLE 7: Comparison of tweakers and stars
Education Apprenticed      School   University                      Unknown/None
Full Sample 40%         7%         15%                              41%
Stars        54%        10%         24%                              18%
Patents 0          1         2-5              6-10           10+
Full Sample 40%        25%         24%                6%             5%
Stars 19%        17%         28%              15%           21%
Employment Owned    Managed   Employed         Unknown    Partnerships 
   (% of owners)
Full Sample        62%         6%         12%              21%           55%
Stars   79%          8%         13%                0%           54%
Rewards        Cash       Medal        Title Appointment    Royal Society
Full Sample         8%         14%           7%             13%           16%
Stars 14%  25%         18%   29%           24%
Publish/Society Published       Membership in Society           Both
Full Sample        13%                        14%           25%
Stars                      14%                        14%           35%42
Conclusions: The Rate and Direction of Technological Progress during the British Industrial
Revolution 
What determined the rate and direction of technological change during the Industrial
Revolution? Explanations can be, very crudely, be classified into demand and supply based
explanations. In his recent book, Allen (2009a) has argued that high wages drove a search for labor-
saving innovation. While we do not propose here an explanation of the macro-inventions that form
the backbone of usual accounts of the Industrial Revolution, we argue that a key ingredient that
complemented these inventions and made them work came from human capital: it was the technical
competence of the British mechanical elite that was able to tweak and implement the great ideas and
turn them into economic realities. The story presented here is entirely supply-based. There is a global
question, “why Europe?”, and a local question, “why British leadership?”  The answer is based on an
unusually felicitous combination of Enlightenment culture, which characterized much of Western
Europe, and technical competence, where Britain had a comparative  advantage. Had it had only one
of those two, it seems unlikely that its economic performance would have been as spectacular. 
The story, however, was not a national but by and large a local one: innovations in textiles,
iron, mining, hardware, and instruments, to pick a few examples, were all local phenomena, relying
largely on local resources including talent. To be sure, our tweakers were mobile even in the pre-
railroad age. Moreover, there were at least two national institutions that gave a certain unity to these
local developments. One was the patent office; despite the consensus view of the literature that
patenting was a fairly minor source of progress, it remained in some ways a national technological
institution whose presence was felt even if it was decided not to use it or if it let its users down. The
other was the Royal Society and similar national institutions such as the Society of Arts, the Royal43
Institution, and the British Association for the Advancement of Science (f. in 1831). 
Are there any policy lessons from this for our age? The one obvious conclusion one can draw
from this is that a few thousand individuals may have played a crucial role in the technological
transformation of the British economy and carried the Industrial Revolution. The average level of
human capital in Britain, as measured by mean literacy rates, school attendance, and even the number
of people attending institutes of higher education are often regarded as surprising low for an industrial
leader. But the useful knowledge that may have mattered was obviously transmitted primarily through
apprentice-master relations, and among those, what counted most were the characteristics of the top
few percentiles of highly skilled and dexterous mechanics and instrument-makers, mill-wrights,
hardware makers, and similar artisans. This may be a more general characteristic of the impact of
human capital on technological creativity: we should focus neither on the mean properties of the
population at large nor on the experiences of the “superstars” but on the group in between. Those who
had the dexterity and competence to tweak, adapt, combine, improve, and debug existing ideas, build
them according to specifications, but with the knowledge to add in what the blueprints left out were
critical to the story. The policy implications of this insight are far from obvious, but clearly if the
source of technological success was a small percentage of the labor force, this is something that an
educational policy would have to take into account.
Finally, the supply of competence reminds us of something rather central about the direction
of innovation, which seems very generally relevant. The direction is dependent on those supply factors
that reflect what engineers and skilled workers actually can do regardless of what they would like to
do. The drive toward improvement was quite general in the eighteenth century, but the results were
highly uneven, with major productivity improvements in textiles, iron, civil engineering, and power44
technology, but few in farming, medicine, steel, chemicals, and communications. These reflected the
difficulties on the supply side rather than any obvious demand-side bias. Competence as defined here
was an integral part of the supply side, as inventors would not be able to carry out their ideas without
the trained workers they employed.45
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